In this paper, we propose a low-complexity, secrecy capacity achieving polar coding scheme for the cognitive interference channel with confidential messages (CICC) under the strong secrecy criterion. Existing polar coding schemes for interference channels rely on the use of polar codes for the multiple access channel, the code construction problem of which can be complicated. We show that the whole secrecy capacity region of the CICC can be achieved by simple point-to-point polar codes due to the cognitivity, and our proposed scheme requires the minimum rate of randomness at the encoder.
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I. INTRODUCTION
C OGNITIVE radio [1] has received increasing attention due to its capability of exploiting the under-utilized spectrum resource, as the scale of wireless networks has been growing drastically nowadays. The cognitive interference channel (CIC) is a typical model for the study of cognitive radios. In this model, a primary user (can be thought of as a licensed user of a frequency band) and a cognitive user (can be thought of as an unlicensed user wishing to share the same frequency band) who has non-causal knowledge of the primary user's message transmit their own messages to their own destinations at the same time. The problem of base station cooperation, in which base stations can share information via backhaul links of unlimited capacity, is a potential application scenario of the CIC. Another practical scenario of the CIC is in the problem of message retransmission, where the cognitive user can hear and decode the first transmission, while the primary user fails to do that. The communication problem in the CIC has been studied in [2] - [7] . The security issue of the CIC was first considered in [8] , which gave the capacity-equivocation region of the CIC with confidential C. Ling is with the Department of Electrical and Electronic Engineering, Imperial College London, London SW7 2AZ, U.K. (e-mail: c.ling@imperial.ac.uk).
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Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/JSAC.2018.2825139 messages (CICC) under the weak secrecy criterion. A more general expression for the achievable rate region of the CICC with additional randomness constraints was derived in [9] under the strong secrecy criterion, which coincides with the result of [8] .
In this paper, we aim to design a polar coding scheme to achieve the whole achievable rate region of [9] . Polar codes [10] , originally targeted for achieving the symmetric capacity of point-to-point channels, have recently been shown to work for multi-user channels as well. It is shown that polar codes achieve the capacity regions or the known achievable rate regions of multiple access channels (MAC) [11] - [14] , broadcast channels [15] , [16] , and interference channels (IC) [17] , [18] . In the area of physical layer security, polar codes have been shown to achieve the secrecy capacity of wiretap channels [19] - [24] , and the secrecy capacity regions or the known secrecy rate regions of MAC wiretap channels [23] , [25] , broadcast channels with confidential messages [22] - [24] , IC with confidential messages [23] , two-way wiretap channels [26] , and bidirectional broadcast channels with common and confidential messages [27] . A capacity achieving secrecy polar coding scheme usually requires some eavesdropper channel information at the transmitter, which can be a drawback in practice. However, this is not a problem in the CICC since the assumption that the cognitive transmitter knows the channel information of both receivers is quite reasonable. Thus, the CICC can be a scenario where secrecy polar coding can be practically used.
The CICC differs from the IC with confidential messages considered by [23] in that only the cognitive user has confidential messages, and the cognitive user has non-causal knowledge about the primary user's messages. The secrecy capacity region of the CICC cannot be achieved by the scheme of [23] since the coding strategy lying behind is totally different. The scheme of [23] is more of an extension of wiretap polar codes while our scheme involves a more complicated design of auxiliary random variables and chaining scheme. We show that the cognitivity not only enlarges the achievable rate region of the IC, but also can help simplify the code design. As shown in [17] , [18] , and [23] , existing polar code designs for ICs that can achieve optimal rate regions require the use of the permutation based MAC polarization [11] , [14] , as it is currently the only method that can achieve the whole achievable rate region of the MAC directly without time sharing or rate splitting. Although for some special types of permutations, MAC polar codes can be constructed using existing efficient methods [18] , the practicality of this method remains open in general since 0733-8716 © 2018 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
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the induced random variable by the permutation can be very complicated. Existing efficient constructing methods for pointto-point polar codes (such as [28] , [29] ) may not be readily applied. In this paper, we show that the whole achievable rate region of the CICC can be achieved by point-to-point polar codes in conjunction with properly designed chaining schemes. We summarize the contributions of this paper as follows.
• We propose a low-complexity polar coding scheme for the general CICC that achieves the whole secrecy capacity region under the strong secrecy criterion, without any assumption on channel symmetry or degradation. • We avoid using MAC polarization, which is a common ingredient of polar code designs for ICs but may increase system complexity, and develop a secrecy capacity achieving scheme which only requires point-to-point polar codes. A novel, cross-transmitter chaining scheme is proposed to fulfill this task. • Secrecy coding schemes require a large amount of randomness in order to protect the confidential message or to perform channel prefixing. As the transmission rate of today's communication systems increases drastically, the required generating rate of randomness in a secrecy coding scheme increases correspondingly, and thus cannot be considered as an unlimited resource.
In this paper, we prove that our proposed scheme achieves the minimum generating rate of randomness. • We show that our proposed scheme is a general solution for several other multi-user polar coding problems, including the CIC without secrecy requirement.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we introduce the CICC model and the achievable rate region. In Section III, we review some background knowledge on polar codes. Details of our proposed scheme are presented in Section IV. We analyze the performance of our proposed scheme in Section V. In Section VI we discuss some extensions of our proposed scheme.
Notations: In this paper, [N ] denotes the index set of {1, 2, . . . , N}. For any A ⊂ [N ], X A denotes the subvector {X i : i ∈ A} of X 1:N {X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X N }. The generator matrix of polar codes is defined as G N = B N F ⊗n [10] , where N = 2 n with n being an arbitrary integer, B N is the bit-reversal matrix, and F = 1 0 1 1 . H q (X) stands for the entropy of X with q-based logarithm. δ N = 2 −N β with some β ∈ (0, 1/2).
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT

A. Channel Model
Definition 1: A 2-user CIC consists of two input alphabets X 1 and X 2 , two output alphabets Y 1 and Y 2 , and a probability transition function P Y1Y2|X1X2 (y 1 , y 2 |x 1 , x 2 ), where x 1 ∈ X 1 and x 2 ∈ X 2 are channel inputs of transmitter 1 and 2, respectively, and y 1 ∈ Y 1 and y 2 ∈ Y 2 are channel outputs of receiver 1 and 2, respectively. The conditional joint probability distribution of the 2-user CIC over N channel uses can be 
factored as
In this channel, transmitter i (i = 1, 2) sends message M i to receiver i. Receiver 1 is required to decode M 1 only while receiver 2 is required to decode both M 1 and M 2 1 . Since transmitter 2 has non-causal knowledge about transmitter 1's message, M 1 can be jointly transmitted by the two transmitters. If transmitter 2 wishes to keep part of its message (denoted as M (s) 2 ) secret from receiver 1, then this model is called the CICC, as shown in Fig. 1 .
and two decoding functionŝ
(3) For a given (2 NR1 , 2 NR2 , N) code for the 2-user CICC, reliability is measured by the average probability of error P e (N ), defined as
where (M 1 , M 2 ) is assumed to be uniformly distributed over M 1 × M 2 . Secrecy is measured by the information leakage (strong secrecy)
or the information leakage rate (weak secrecy)
B. Achievable Rate Region
Let R 2s be the transmission rate of confidential message M (s) 2 . A rate triple (R 1 , R 2 , R 2s ) is said to be achievable for the 2-user CICC if there exists a coding scheme such that lim N →∞ P e (N ) = 0; (7) and lim N →∞ L(N ) = 0 (strong secrecy), or (8) lim N →∞ L R (N ) = 0 (weak secrecy).
The capacity-equivocation region of the CICC (under the constraint that the cognitive receiver must decode both transmitters' messages) was derived in [8] and is shown below. Theorem 1 ( [8] ): The capacity-equivocation region of the CICC under the weak secrecy criterion is
where P = {P UV X1X2 factorizing as: P U,V,X1 P X2|V }, and the cardinality bounds for auxiliary random variables U and V are
As we know, secrecy coding schemes require a large amount of randomness in the encoder. Reference [9] considered the generating rate of randomness needed by the stochastic encoder as a constraint and developed a more general achievable rate region under the strong secrecy criterion as shown in Theorem 2. In [9] , besides the common message and the confidential message, transmitter 2's message was further divided into a private message, which should be decoded by receiver 2 but not necessarily be secret from receiver 1.
and
where R r is the rate of randomness, and R 2p is transmitter 2's private message rate. Then R * is an achievable rate region for the CICC. The cardinality bounds for auxiliary random variables U and V are the same as in Theorem 1.
III. POLAR CODING PRELIMINARIES
Polar codes were originally invented to achieve the symmetric capacity of discrete memoryless channels (DMC) [10] . To deal with non-uniform input distribution, one may apply Gallager's alphabet extension method [30, p. 208] as in [17] , the chaining construction [31] , or a more direct method which invokes results on polar coding for lossless compression [32] . Reference [33] proposed a refined method which overcomes the major drawback of the scheme in [32] that the encoder and decoder need to share a large amount of random mappings. Now we briefly review this method.
Let W (Y |X) be a DMC with a q X -ary input alphabet X , where q X is a prime number 2 , and an arbitrary countable output alphabet Y. Let U 1:N = X 1:N G N and define H (N ) (21) which satisfy [22] , [34] 
Define the information set (or reliable set), frozen set and almost deterministic set respectively as follows:
D is called almost deterministic because part of its indices, (H (N )
X ) C , are not fully polarized. The encoding procedure goes as follows:
• {u j } j∈I carry information, • {u j } j∈F are filled with uniformly distributed frozen symbols (shared between the transmitter and the receiver), • {u j } j∈D are randomly generated according to conditional probability P U j |U 1:j−1 (u|u 1:j−1 ).
In order for the receiver to decode successfully, [33] proposed to send part of the almost deterministic symbols,
X|Y ) C , to the receiver with some reliable error-correcting code separately, the rate of which is shown to vanish as N goes to infinity.
Having received y 1:N and recovered
X|Y ) C , the receiver decodes u 1:N with a successive cancellation decoder (SCD):
X|Y . The transmission rate of this scheme, R = |I|/N , is shown to achieve channel capacity [32] lim N →∞
IV. PROPOSED POLAR CODING SCHEME
In this paper, we only discuss the case when random variables X 1 , X 2 , U and V all have prime alphabets. Suppose q X1 = |X 1 | and q X2 = |X 2 | are two prime numbers, q U = |U| is the smallest prime number larger than |X 1 | · |X 2 | + 3, and q V = |V| is the smallest prime number larger than
that satisfy (10) and (11) . The goal of our proposed scheme is to achieve every equation in (12)- (17) .
Our encoding scheme is illustrated in Fig. 2 . Transmitter 1's message M 1 is split into two parts, M ) and encoded into V 1:N (known as superposition coding). Finally, randomness M R is added to V 1:N to generate transmitter 2's final codeword X 1:N 2 (known as channel prefixing). Note that X 1:N 1 can be seen as the known interference to transmitter 2. Thus, this superposition coding scheme also involves the idea of dirty paper coding. In the rest of this section, the rates of M
and M (s) 2 will be denoted by R
The chaining method [38] is a commonly adopted way to solve the problem unaligned polar indices in multi-user channels, which is also used in our scheme. Furthermore, we show that with properly designed chaining schemes, the secrecy capacity region of the CICC can be achieved with pointto-point polar codes. In our scheme, m (m ≥ 1) encoding blocks are chained into a frame, and two receivers decode a frame in reverse orders. Our scheme is designed in such a way that receiver 1 (the primary receiver) decodes in the natural order (i.e., from block 1 to block m) while receiver 2 (the secondary receiver) decodes in the reverse order (i.e., from block m to block 1).
A. Common Message Encoding
Since common messages M
1 and M (c) 2 are encoded into two sequences of random variables, X 1:N 1 and U 1:N , it is natural to consider designing a compound MAC polar code for the two synthetic MACs, P (Y 1 |X 1 , U) and P (Y 2 |X 1 , U). This approach requires the use of MAC polarization or rate splitting which will increase the complexity. Note that there is no major difference between M in regard to the encoding. They only affect the rate allocation between M 1 and M 2 . Due to this flexibility and the cognitivity of the channel, cross-transmitter chaining schemes can be designed to do rate allocation between the two users instead of using MAC polar codes or rate splitting. For simplicity, define R (c) = R
We first show how to achieve (30) in this subsection and R 
Then define the following sets of indices for U 1:N 1 :
where I
1c and I
1c are the reliable sets for receiver 1 and 2 respectively, F 1c is the intersection of two receivers' frozen sets, and D 1c is the almost deterministic set. Similarly define
for U 1:N . From (29) we have
If we design two separate chaining schemes for U 1:N and U 1:N respectively, it is easy to verify that the achievable common message rate is
Such a scheme achieves (30) only in the following two cases:
. In the following two other cases of
, the achievable rate in (35) is strictly smaller than that in (30) . In these cases, the chaining scheme should be jointly designed for U 1:N and U 1:N , which we refer to as cross-transmitter chaining.
1) Case 1 and Case 2: Since Case 2 is similar to Case 1 by swapping the roles of two transmitters, we only describe the chaining scheme in Case 1 for brevity. From (34) we know that given sufficiently large N , we always have |I (1) 1c | ≤ |I (2) 1c | and |I (1) 2c | ≤ |I (2) 2c |. Define
Choose an arbitrary subset I (2a) 1c
of I
1c \ I (1) 1c such that |I (I) In the 1st block, transmitter 1 encodes its common message as:
store message symbols from M
1c ∪D1c) C carry frozen symbols uniformly distributed over X 1 , • {u j 1 } j∈D1c are randomly generated according to conditional probability P U j 1 |U 1:j−1 1 (u|u 1:j−1 1 ), and transmitter 2 encodes its common message as: Fig. 3 . The chaining scheme of transmitter k (k = 1, 2) for common messages in Case 1.
2c ∪D2c) C carry frozen symbols uniformly distributed over U, • {u j } j∈D2c are randomly generated according to conditional probability P U j |U 1:j−1 (u|u 1:j−1 ). The chaining scheme in Case 1 is shown in Fig. 3 . After each transmission block, transmitter 1 additionally sends a vanishing fraction of the almost deterministic symbols, {u j 1 } j∈ (H (N )
) C , to receiver 1 and 2 respectively with some reliable error-correcting code. Similarly, transmitter 2 sends {u j } j∈(H (N )
) C to the two receivers respectively after each block. From Section III we know that the rate for transmitting these symbols vanishes as N increases. Thus, the cost for these extra transmissions can be made negligible.
Also note that frozen symbols at F kc ∪ I (2) kc \ (I
kc ∪ I (2a) kc ) (k = 1, 2) can be reused since they only need to be independently and uniformly distributed. Thus, the rate of frozen symbols which must be shared between transmitters and receivers can be made negligible as well by reusing them over sufficient number of blocks. In the secrecy analysis we will prove that the reuse of frozen symbols does not harm secrecy.
2) Case 3 and Case 4: Since Case 4 is similar to Case 3 by swapping the roles of two transmitters, we only describe the chaining scheme in Case 3 for brevity. In this case, given sufficiently large N , we always have |I (1) 1c | ≤ |I (2) 1c | and |I (1) 2c | ≥ |I
, which we refer to as Case 3-1, we have |I (2) 1c |−|I (1) 1c | ≥ |I (1) 2c |−|I (2) 2c | for sufficiently large N . In this case, define I 
Choose an arbitrary subset I 2c . The chaining scheme in Case 3-1 goes as follows and is illustrated in Fig. 4 .
(I) In the 1st block, the encoding procedure is similar to Case 1, except that {u j } j∈I (1b) 2c of transmitter 2 are filled with message symbols from M (1) 1 only, as they will be chained with transmitter 1's next encoding block.
(II) In the ith (1 < i < m) block, transmitter 1 assigns
with the same value of {u j Otherwise if min{I(U, X 1 ; Y 1 ), I(U, X 1 ; Y 2 )} = I(U, X 1 ; Y 2 ), which we refer to as Case 3-2, we have |I (2) 1c | − |I (1) 1c | ≤ |I (1) 2c | − |I (2) 2c | given sufficiently large N . The chaining scheme in this case is similar to that in Fig. 4 with the two transmitters exchanging their roles.
Similar to Case 1, two transmitters send part of their almost deterministic symbols to the two receivers with some reliable error-correcting code after each block. Also, transmitter 1's frozen symbols at F 1c ∪ I (2) 1c \ (I (1) 1c ∪ I (2a) 1c ) and transmitter 2's frozen symbols at F 2c can be reused over different blocks.
B. Private and Confidential Message Encoding
Since private message M 
Partition the indices of V 1:N as follows:
where I 2s is the reliable and secure set, I 2p is the reliable but insecure set, R 2 is the unreliable and insecure set, F 2 is the frozen set, and D 2c is the almost deterministic set. The aim of using the chaining method here is to deal with the unreliable and insecure set R 2 . Consider the positive secrecy rate case (i.e., the right-hand-side of (15) is positive). In this case, |I 2s | > |R 2 | always holds for sufficiently large N . Choose a subset I (2) 2s of I 2s such that |I (2) 2s | = |R 2 |. Denote I (1) 2s = I 2s \ I (2) 2s . The chaining scheme for transmitter 2's private and confidential messages is also designed in such a way that receiver 2 decodes from block m to block 1, same as its decoding order for common messages. Details of the scheme are as follows and shown in Fig. 5 .
(I) In the 1st block,
2s store confidential message symbols from (2) 2s ∪R2 carry private message symbols from M (p) 2 , • {v j } j∈F2 are filled with frozen symbols uniformly distributed over V, • {v j } j∈D2 are randomly generated according to conditional probability P V j |X 1:N 1 U 1:N V 1:j−1 , (II) In the ith (1 < i < m) block, {v j } i∈I (2) 2s are assigned with the same value as {v j } i∈R2 in the (i − 1)th block, and the rest of v 1:N are determined in the same way as in (I). (III) In the mth block, {v j } j∈R2 carry some uniformly distributed random symbols that are shared only between transmitter 2 and receiver 2 (known as secret seed), and the rest of v 1:N are determined in the same way as in (II).
The secret seed rate can be made arbitrarily small by increasing the number of chained blocks in a frame. After each transmission block, transmitter 2 additionally sends a vanishing fraction of the almost deterministic symbols,
to receiver 2 secretly with some reliable error-correcting code. Note that unlike in the common message encoding, the additional transmission here must be kept secret from receiver 1. Nevertheless, the rate of this transmission can be made arbitrarily small by increasing N . Similar to the common message encoding, frozen symbols at F 2 can also be reused over different blocks.
C. Channel Prefixing
To generate the final codeword X 1:N 2 for transmitter 2, one can transmit (X 1:N 1 , U 1:N , V 1:N ) through a virtual channel with transition probability P X2|X1UV . Also, one can consider X 2 and (X 1 , U, V ) as correlated sources and apply polar source coding to obtain the final codeword. To design a scheme that requires the minimum generating rate of randomness, we take the latter approach in this paper. Let U 1:
Let w r be a random sequence uniformly distributed over X 2 and of length |H
can be obtained as follows:
are filled with random symbols uniformly distributed over X 2 , • {u j 2 } j∈(H (N ) X 2 |X 1 UV ) C are randomly generated according to conditional probability P 
are very unreliable for receiver 1, thus reusing them does not harm security. We will show in the next section that with such a channel prefixing approach, our proposed scheme can achieve strong secrecy.
D. Decoding
1) Common Message Decoding:
We first consider receiver 1, who decodes from block 1 to block m. Although we have considered different cases in Section IV-A, the decoding procedure can be summarized in a unified form as follows:
(I) In the 1st block, receiver 1 first decodes {u j
with a SCD and obtains an estimate ofū 1:N 1 . Then it decodes
with a SCD, in whichū 1:N 1 is treated as side information, and obtains an estimate ofū 1:N .
(II) In the ith
are deduced fromū 1:N 1 andū 1:N in block i − 1 according to different cases (see Fig. 3 and Fig. 4) , and the rest are decoded in the same way as in (I).
(III) In the mth block, {ū j 1 } j∈I (1a) 1c and {ū j 1 } j∈I (1a) 2c are decoded as frozen symbols, and the rest are decoded in the same way as in (II).
Receiver 2 decodes the common messages similarly, except that it decodes from block m to block 1.
2) Private and Confidential Messages Decoding: Receiver 2 decodes the private and confidential messages from block m to block 1 as follows.
(I) In the mth block, receiver 2 decodes {v j } j∈I2p∪I2s withû 1:N 1 andû 1:N in the same block being treated as side information, whereû 1:N 1 andû 1:N are its decoding results of the common messages, and obtains an estimate ofv 1:N .
(II) In the ith (1 ≤ i < m) block, {v j } i∈R2 are deduced from {v j } i∈I (2) 2s in block i + 1, and the rest are decoded in the same way as in (I). Lemma 1:
V. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
A. Total Variation Distance
P U 1:N V 1:N X 1:N 1 X 1:N 2 Y 1:N 1 Y 1:N 2 −PŨ1:NṼ 1:NX 1:N 1X 1:N 2Ỹ 1:N 1Ỹ 1:N 2 ≤ δ c N . (41) where δ c N √ 2 log 2 √ N δ N (2 + 2 √ 3). Proof: See Appendix A.
B. Error Performance
Lemma 2: The error probability of receiver 1 (resp. 2) in decoding all common messages in a whole frame can be upper bounded by
while the error probability of receiver 2 in decoding all private and confidential messages in a frame can be upper bounded by
C. Secrecy
We first introduce some notations used in this subsection. In the ith (1 ≤ i ≤ m) block, the outputs of Enc 1, 2a and 2b (see Fig. 2 ) are denoted by X 1,i , U i and V i , respectively. Transmitter 2's confidential message at I (1) 2s is denoted by M i , and private message at I (2) 2s (which is used for chaining) by E i . Receiver 1's channel output is denoted by Y 1,i . The additionally transmitted almost deterministic symbols in U 1:N 1 and U 1:N are denoted by D 1c,i and D 2c,i , respectively. The reused frozen symbols in U 1:N 1 , U 1:N and V 1:N are denoted by F 1c , F 2c and F 2p , respectively. The non-reused frozen symbols (see Fig. 3 and 4 ) in U 1:N 1 in the 1st and mth blocks are denoted by F 11 and F 1m respectively, and those in U 1:N by F 21 and F 2m respectively. The reused randomness at H (N ) X2|Y1X1UV in the channel prefixing scheme is denoted by W . For brevity,
Lemma 3: For any i ∈ [m], we have 
Lemma 4: For any
Then we have From the proof of Lemma 5 and the fact that receiver 1 has no knowledge about the secret seed we have L m ≤ O(N 5/2 2 −N β /2 ). Thus, by induction hypothesis we have
D. Achievable Rate Region 1) Randomness Rate: Since w r is reused in a frame, the generating rate of randomness required by our channel prefixing scheme is
From [39, Lemma 1] we have
Then we have lim N →∞,m→∞
Thus, (17) is achievable with our proposed scheme.
2) Private and Confidential Message Rates: From Fig. 5 we can see that the private and confidential message rates in our proposed scheme are
respectively. By a similar analysis to the general wiretap polar code [24] , we have
Thus, (15) is achieved. Since the difference between transmitter 2's private message and the randomness required by the encoder is just whether it carries information [9] , from (51), (53) and the Markov chain of (11) we can see that (16) is achieved.
3) Common Message Rate:
We first consider Case 1. In this case, the common message rates of the two transmitters in our proposed scheme are
respectively. From (34) we have
Since min{I(U, X 1 ; Y 1 ), I(U, X 1 ; Y 2 )} = I(U, X 1 ; Y 1 ) in this case, if we allocate all of R (c) to transmitter 1's message, then (12) is achieved. No matter how we allocate two transmitters' common messages, the sum rate of all messages always achieves (14) .
To prove the achievability of (13) in Case 1 requires some changes in the coding scheme. If we wish to maximize the sum rate of private and confidential messages, transmitter 2 will not help transmit M 1 at all. Therefore, whether receiver 1 can decode U does not matter. Then transmitter 2 can use all of I (2) 2c to transmit its own message at any rate below I(U ; Y 2 |X 1 ) (now this message becomes private message). Then from (53) and (54) we can see that (13) is achieved.
Another thing worth noting is that, in the above case, in order for both receivers to decode transmitter 1's message,
Then the sum rate of all messages satisfies
which may seem to violate (14) . However, since U in fact carries private message in this case, it is equivalent to remove auxiliary random variable U and simply design a code on V . We can also see this problem from the mutual information aspect. Due to the Markov chains of (10) and (11), we have
With auxiliary random variable U being removed, we can readily see that (14) still holds. Next we consider Case 3-1. In this case, R 
Then from (53), (54) and (57) we can see that (13) is achieved (R 2p in Theorem 2 is the sum of R here). Since Case 2 (resp. 4) is similar to Case 1 (resp. 3), and Case 3-2 is similar to Case 3-1, we can now conclude that our proposed scheme achieves the whole region in Theorem 2 under the strong secrecy criterion with randomness constraint.
VI. DISCUSSION
Although our proposed polar coding scheme is designed under secrecy constraints, it can be readily modified for the case without secrecy and achieve the capacity region of the CIC given by [8, Th. 4] , since the capacity region is just a special case of the capacity-equivocation region when secrecy constraints are removed.
We note some relations between our work and [22] , which considers polar coding for the broadcast channel with confidential messages. From Theorem 2 and [22, Th. 1] we can see that the rate region in [22, Th. 1] is a special case of that in Theorem 2 when transmitter 1 is removed. Also, as shown in [8] , the region defined in Theorem 1 reduces to the capacity region of the MAC with degraded message sets if we set Y 1 = Y 2 . Thus, our proposed scheme can be seen as a general solution for the aforementioned multi-user polar coding problems. 
where (58) 
where (·) i denotes vectors in block i,Ū denotes the decoding result of U , and "chaining" in the superscript stands for the elements used for chaining. Using optimal coupling [ (68)
To estimate receiver 2's error probability in decoding its private and confidential messages in block i, P (p,s) e2,i , we define the following error events: 
Using 
APPENDIX C PROOF OF LEMMA 3
Let t = |I 2s | + |I 2p | and w = |F 2 |. Denote {a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a t } = I 2s with a 1 < . . . < a t , {b 1 , b 2 , . . . , b w } = F 2 with b 1 < . . . < b w , and {c 1 , c 2 , . . . , c t+w } = {a 1 , . . . , a t , b 1 , . . . , b w } with c 1 < . . . < c t+w . Let F c be short for {F 1c , F 2c , F 11 , F 1m , F 21 , F 2m }. Then we have
= t + w − 
